(转）Warren Buffett Is a Risk Taker, Not a Sleepy Investor
发表于： 2011-03-04 03:21:15
Warren Buffett Is a Risk Taker, Not a Sleepy Investor
2 comments
| by: Carlos X. Alexandre March 01, 2011 | about:
BRK.A
After reading Warren Buffett’s
2010 letter
(pdf) with the same interest as any other piece, I always peruse the media for various interpretations and observations. What I have read thus far, either paints Warren as a genius, having accumulated his wealth through methodical, long-term investing, or the complete opposite, making Mr. Buffett the villain and part of the financial meltdown problem — and just about everything in between.
I remember his words about buying Conoco Phillips (
COP
) being a mistake, along with investments in Irish banks, and that fact is documented in his
2008 letter to shareholders.(pdf)
I told you in an earlier part of this report that last year I made a major mistake of commission (and maybe more; this one sticks out). Without urging from Charlie or anyone else, I bought a large amount of ConocoPhillips stock when oil and gas prices were near their peak. I in no way anticipated the dramatic fall in energy prices that occurred in the last half of the year. I still believe the odds are good that oil sells far higher in the future than the current 50 price. But so far I have been dead wrong. Even if prices should rise, moreover, the terrible timing of my purchase has cost Berkshire several billion dollars. I made some other already-recognizable errors as well. They were smaller, but unfortunately not small. During 2008, I spent 27 million, for an 89% loss. Since then, the two stocks have declined even further. The tennis crowd would call my mistakes “unforced errors.”
What the above highlights is that he was concerned about the short–term impact of his investment decisions, that timing is important, and that he is fallible like everyone else. Having said that, it’s pretty obvious that his shortcomings are outnumbered by his success stories — and I admire the guy for his openness, although limited and rightly so. It’s not as if Warren Buffett knocks on our door and whispers his next move, and anyone who would expect that to happen is living in Wonderland. So, I do not give him “put downs” like my daughter would phrase it, but rather look into his style, and compare it with how the media portrays him.
Most everyone knows by now that he bought Berkshire Hathaway (
BRK.A
), a textile company, then transformed it into a holding company — threads were not his thing — and the rest is history. Not so fast, and Warren brought a little perspective to that story in his most recent letter, which may get lost in translation.
When I took control of Berkshire in 1965, I didn’t exploit this advantage. Berkshire was then only in textiles, where it had in the previous decade lost significant money. The dumbest thing I could have done was to pursue “opportunities” to improve and expand the existing textile operation – so for years that’s exactly what I did. And then, in a final burst of brilliance, I went out and bought another textile company. Aaaaaaargh! Eventually I came to my senses, heading first into insurance and then into other industries.
The lengthy “Argh!” is probably a realization of the time lost pursuing a non-workable investment — and I love the expression’s unassuming nature. But without going into all the details of his letter, a very telling piece that sheds some light on who Warren Buffett is as an investor is found on page 19 and refers to “equity puts.”
The future of these contracts is, of course, uncertain. But here is one perspective on them. If the prices of the relevant indices are the same at the contract expiration dates as these prices were on December 31, 2010 – and foreign exchange rates are unchanged – we would owe $3.8 billion on expirations occurring from 2018 to 2026. You can call this amount “settlement value.”
On our yearend balance sheet, however, we carry the liability for those remaining equity puts at 2.9 billion gain in the years to come, that being the difference between the liability figure of 3.8 billion. I believe that equity prices will very likely increase and that our liability will fall significantly between now and settlement date. If so, our gain from this point will be even greater. But that,of course, is far from a sure thing.
On December 31, 2010, the S&P 500 (
SPY
) closed at 1,257, and the obviousness within the statement is that Warren Buffett is a bull going forward — well into the future — and when 2018 rolls around, we’ll see where we are. However one cannot take the “bull” position at face value because insurance is Warren’s “thing” and he can use the premiums collected for the next 7 years, interest free! But at this juncture one can compare the above excerpt with an article published by
Vanity Fair
stating that he “had condemned derivative contracts as early as 2003, describing them as “time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and the economic system,” when Warren told Charlie Rose on PBS “that such derivatives were nothing short of ‘financial weapons of mass destruction.’” Apparently he likes the weapons as much as the next guy because the leverage can be extremely rewarding.
Warren Buffett is not the sleepy investor, slowly accumulating dividends, and strictly banking on stock value appreciation, but rather a high stakes poker player and a potential bluff master. Good for him. But next time you think about picking up a copy of “The Buffettology Workbook: Value Investing The Warren Buffett Way,” co-authored by David Clark and Mary Buffett, (She gained her unique insight while married to Warren’s son Peter for twelve years, according to her bio on
amazon.com)
think twice before buying into it, although it will only set you back $12. My take on Warren Buffett’s style is that he keeps the competition off balance as much as he can, and he’s fully aware that everything he says is read with avid interest.
Buffett’s investment rules are many, but potentially the most entertaining response that Warren could articulate is summarized by this
Bloomberg article
— and everyone ran with it as gospel.
“The single most important decision in evaluating a business is pricing power,” Buffett told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in an interview released by the panel last week. “If you’ve got the power to raise prices without losing business to a competitor, you’ve got a very good business. And if you have to have a prayer session before raising the price by 10 percent, then you’ve got a terrible business.”
I heard it differently and I translated that statement as literally saying “Now you go out and find those companies that actually have pricing power considering the global economic dynamics, and do your own homework while you’re at it, because I’m not telling you how I go about my business.” Does BNSF have the “pricing power” to raise prices 10% without a prayer? But that should keep them busy until the next conversation.
If there is one tip that he gave in his letter, it pertains to risk management, the selection of Todd Combs, and how thinking outside the box is the ultimate weapon.
It’s easy to identify many investment managers with great recent records. But past results, though important, do not suffice when prospective performance is being judged. How the record has been achieved is crucial, as is the manager’s understanding of – and sensitivity to – risk (which in no way should be measured by beta, the choice of too many academics). In respect to the risk criterion, we were looking for someone with a hard-to-evaluate skill: the ability to anticipate the effects of economic scenarios not previously observed.
One of my favorite passages is found in his
2000 letter
(pdf), especially because it is preceded by the statement that he and Charlie never engage in speculation.
The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money.
And in the same 2000 letter, he offered yet more tips — and he chose to italicize the word “nothing” — while emphasizing the cash flow component, although he doesn’t explain how to examine a cash flow statement, and not all cash flows are equal where some positives are actually negatives.
Common yardsticks such as dividend yield, the ratio of price to earnings or to book value, and even growth rates have nothing to do with valuation except to the extent they provide clues to the amount and timing of cash flows into and from the business.
I do believe that up to a point, Warren’s driving force was about the money, just like most people. Now it’s about the game.
评论
- brka (2011-03-07 14:25): 老巴介绍价值投资可理解为不浪费时间前提下投资股市的流行方法。 老巴一定还有很多东西不介绍，因为其余的是个人习惯。
- 段永平 → brka (2011-03-08 02:31): 我想关于投资的东西巴菲特从来就没有保留过，只是很多人 心里有障碍，看不到而已。 至于他老人家晚上睡觉前是不是要泡泡脚的问题倒确实可能被 保留了 。
- 段永平 (2011-03-05 15:04): 没觉得这文章有啥特别不对的。 我印象中的巴菲特确实是个可以冒一定风险的人。 记得很久以前，又一次在网上看他打桥牌，他居然在缺两个A的情况下冲上了7无将。大概是希望对手首攻出错吧 。
- 衡山行侠 → 段永平 (2011-03-05 16:21): 我个人觉得作者的意思好像"否定"巴菲特的倾向更强一些，供商榷。 文中说到：Warren Buffett is …a high stakes poker player and a potential bluff master. ….next time you think about picking up a copy of “….Value Investing ….,” …think twice before buying into it, although it will only set you back $12. My take on Warren Buffett’s style is that he keeps the competition off balance as much as he can, and he’s fully aware that everything he says is read with avid interest. 他的意思是巴菲特是一个“诈牌的人”；虽然《价值投资》那本书便宜，但是买之前要思考两次；他认为巴菲特是通过尽可能“让竞争失衡”而获胜，即通过“诈牌”而不是分析价值而获胜。）
- 段永平 → 衡山行侠 (2011-03-06 01:48): 哈，你英语比我好，我没注意这段 。 不过，我很喜欢看别人“否定”巴菲特，持“否定”的人越多我越高兴。记得刚刚开始做投资时想起的不知谁下海南时说的一句 话：“此地钱多、人傻、快来！” 。
- xlli777 → 段永平 (2011-03-06 19:25): 今天休息，我把这篇文章翻成中文了，不爱看英文的朋友们可以到这儿看看：http://xlli777.blog.163.com/blog/static/13856777120112611633601/ 关于那个“否定”，从字面上也的确像是在指责老巴骗人，指责他让大家用他所说的逻辑去找股票而自己另辟蹊径赚钱。此处略显阴谋论的观点和全文的中立客观论调不大连贯。 另外考虑到连作者的女儿都说他在“put down（驳斥）”老巴，也许作者生活中一贯就是不以老巴为然的。这篇文章也许只是故作客观 。 老巴说议价能力强好，也不用他买的所有的公司都是随兴可以涨价的啊，作者有点儿教条主义了。
- 衡山行侠 → 段永平 (2011-03-07 08:56): 段兄客气，其实好多地方我没看懂 。 “不知者无畏”，板门弄斧，段兄和版上大牛莫笑就是了 。
- 黄振汉 (2011-03-05 14:40): 没有太仔细看文章，不过我觉得这是误解 巴菲特的核心理念只有一条：当价格远低于价值就买----以前是买差的公司，现在一般只买好公司 即使这样，由于人们认知角度的不同，他认为安全的投资，往往会被别人认为是危险的投资 另外巴菲特擅长认识到什么时候股市到底了，认识到什么公司股票价格低于其价值，但是他不是很擅长预测顶部在哪里，也不是很擅长预测经济的波动，所以也会有几个不是很成功的投资，这也很正常
- 衡山行侠 (2011-03-04 10:14): 好不容易读完了，呵呵。 在美帝怀疑巴老的人和国内的那些怀疑者腔调还挺一致：都是断章取义，试图从巴老的只言片语中找到蛛丝马迹，而不是系统的了解巴老的体系，具体表现就是把概率的错误当作投资原则的错误（比如文中的“康菲石油”），把一种操作技术和另一种操作技术混淆（如文中的“定价能力”和“BNSF”)，然后收集起来一起作为“罪证”，用来否定全部。 另外，关于卖equity puts，我斗胆问一下，这是不是需要采取分散投资？比如不同的标的，不同的国家，不同的交割期限，越多越好，前提是自己足够了解标的的内在价值。如果只有简单的几种，一旦极端情况出现，损失会非常惨重。如同卖保险一样，越分散，“大数原则”的优势就越容易体现出来（我在国内，做不了put，段兄请放心，我只是好奇，想弄清而已，呵呵）
- 大刀王五 → 衡山行侠 (2011-03-04 11:05): 读了半天， 也没搞清楚作者到底想说什么。