548-THE SUPERINVESTORS OF

THE SUPERINVESTORS OF

发表于： 2010-04-02 05:59:46

如果有谁还不太理解什么叫价值投资，看看巴菲特1984年写的这篇东西或许会很有帮助。这里的是节选，没找到中文的，不好意思。

哈哈，刚刚发现有人给翻译过来了，真是非常谢谢啊
。
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_600ae2530100gnoc.html

THE SUPERINVESTORS OF

GRAHAM-AND-DODDSVILLE

by Warren E. Buffett

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is an edited transcript of a talk given at Columbia University in 1984 commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of
Security Analysis
, written by Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd. This specialized volume first introduced the ideas later popularized in
The Intelligent Investor
. Buffett’s essay offers a fascinating study of how Graham’s disciples have used Graham’s value investing approach to realize phenomenal success in the stock market.

If you have a high-speed internet connection, you may prefer to read
this version
of the speech (a 1.6 MB .pdf file), which has all of the tables.

Note: the tables Buffett mentions are in
The Intelligent Investor
, but are not reproduced here. The Sequoia and Munger records are published
here
.

Is the Graham and Dodd “look for values with a significant margin of safety relative to prices” approach to security analysis out of date? Many of the professors who write textbooks today say yes. They argue that the stock market is efficient; that is, that stock prices reflect everything that is known about a company’s prospects and about the state of the economy. There are no undervalued stocks, these theorists argue, because there are smart security analysts who utilize all available information to ensure unfailingly appropriate prices. Investors who seem to beat the market year after year are just lucky. “If prices fully reflect available information, this sort of investment adeptness is ruled out,” writes on
e of today’s textbook authors.

Well, maybe. But I want to present to you a group of investors who have, year in and year out, beaten the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index. The hypothesis that they do this by pure chance is at least worth examining. Crucial to this examination is the fact that these winners were all well known to me and pre-identified as superior investors, the most recent identification occurring over fifteen years ago. Absent this condition - that is, if I had just recently searched among thousands of records to select a few names for you this morning — I would advise you to stop reading right here. I should add that all of these records have been audited. And I should further add that I have known many of those who have invested with these managers, and the checks received by those participants over the years have matched the stated records.

Before we begin this examination, I would like you to imagine a national coin-flipping contest. Let’s assume we get 225 million Americans up tomorrow morning and we ask them all to wager a dollar. They go out in the morning at sunrise, and they all call the flip of a coin. If they call correctly, they win a dollar from those who called wrong. Each day the losers drop out, and on the subsequent day the stakes build as all previous winnings are put on the line. After ten flips on ten mornings, there will be approximately 220,000 people in the United States who have correctly called ten flips in a row. They each will have won a little over $1,000.

Now this group will probably start getting a little puffed up about this, human nature being what it is. They may try to be modest, but at cocktail parties they will occasionally admit to attractive members of the opposite sex what their technique is, and what marvelous insights they bring to the field of flipping.

Assuming that the winners are getting the appropriate rewards from the losers, in another ten days we will have 215 people who have successfully called their coin flips 20 times in a row and who, by this exercise, each have turned on
e dollar into a little over $1million.$225 million would have been lost, $225 million would have been won.

By then, this group will really lose their heads. They will probably write books on “How I turned a Dollar into a Million in Twenty Days Working Thirty Seconds a Morning.” Worse yet, they’ll probably start jetting around the country attending seminars on efficient coin-flipping and tackling skeptical professors with, ” If it can’t be done, why are there 215 of us?”

By then some business school professor will probably be rude enough to bring up the fact that if 225 million orangutans had engaged in a similar exercise, the results would be much the same - 215 egotistical orangutans with 20 straight winning flips.

I would argue, however, that there are some imp
ortant differences in the examples I am going to present. For on
e thing, if (a) you had taken 225 million orangutans distributed roughly as the U.S. population is; if (b) 215 winners were left after 20 days; and if (c) you found that 40 came from a particular zoo in Omaha, you would be pretty sure you were on to something. So you would probably go out and ask the zookeeper about what he’s feeding them, whether they had special exercises, what books they read, and who knows what else. That is, if you found any really extraordinary concentrations of success, you might want to see if you could identify concentrations of unusual characteristics that might be causal factors.

Scientific inquiry naturally follows such a pattern. If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer — with, say, 1,500 cases a year in the United States — and you found that 400 of them occurred in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables. You know it’s not random chance that 400 come from a small area. You would not necessarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search.

I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography. In addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an
intellectual
origin. I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville. A concentration of winners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to this particular intellectual village.

Conditions could exist that would make even that concentration unimp
ortant. Perhaps 100 people were simply imitating the coin-flipping call of some terribly persuasive personality. When he called heads, 100 followers automatically called that coin the same way. If the leader was part of the 215 left at the end, the fact that 100 came from the same intellectual origin would mean nothing. You would simply be identifying on
e case as a hundred cases. Similarly, let’s assume that you lived in a strongly patriarchal society and every family in the United States conveniently consisted of ten members. Further assume that the patriarchal culture was so strong that, when the 225 million people went out the first day, every member of the family identified with the father’s call. Now, at the end of the 20-day period, you would have 215 winners, and you would find that they came from on
ly 21.5 families. Some naive types might say that this indicates an enormous hereditary factor as an explanation of successful coin-flipping. But, of course, it would have no significance at all because it would simply mean that you didn’t have 215 individual winners, but rather 21.5 randomly distributed families who were winners.

In this group of successful investors that I want to consider, there has been a common intellectual patriarch, Ben Graham. But the children who left the house of this intellectual patriarch have called their “flips” in very different ways. They have gone to different places and bought and sold different stocks and companies, yet they have had a combined record that simply cannot be explained by the fact that they are all calling flips identically because a leader is signaling the calls for them to make. The patriarch has merely set forth the intellectual theory for making coin-calling decisions, but each student has decided on his own manner of applying the theory.

The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this: they search for discrepancies between the
value
of a business and the
price
of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially, they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist’s concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday, or whether it is January or July, etc. Incidentally, when businessmen buy businesses, which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the purchase of marketable stocks — I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week or the month in which the transaction is going to occur. If it doesn’t make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday, I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those same businesses. Our Graham & Dodd investors, needless to say, do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model, or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact, most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focus on two variables: price and value.

I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume beha
vior, the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked
up
substantially last week and the week before? Of course, the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now, in the age of computers, there are almost endless da
ta available about them. It isn’t necessarily because such studies have any utility; it’s simply that the da
ta are there and academicians have [worked] hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. On
ce these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

I think the group that we have identified by a common intellectual home is worthy of study. Incidentally, despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price, volume, seasonality, capitalization size, etc., upon stock performance, no interest has been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentration of value-oriented winners.

I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation from 1954 through 1956. There were on
ly four — I have not selected these names from among thousands. I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after I took Ben Graham’s class, but he turned me down as overvalued. He took this value stuff very seriously! After much pestering he finally hired me. There were three partners and four of us as the “peasant” level. All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up, and it’s possible to trace the record of three.

The first example (see Table 1) is that of Walter Schloss. Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years. Here is what “Adam Smith” — after I told him about Walter — wrote about him in
Supermoney
(1972):

He has no connections or access to useful information. Practically no on
e in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports, and that’s about it.

In introducing me to (Schloss) Warren had also, to my mind, described himself. “He never forgets that he is handling other people’s money, and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss.” He has total integrity and a realistic picture of himself. Money is real to him and stocks are real — and from this flows an attraction to the “margin of safety” principle.

Walter has diversified enormously, owning well over 100 stocks currently. He knows how to identify securities that sell at considerably less than their value to a private owner.
And that’s all he does.
He doesn’t worry about whether it it’s January, he doesn’t worry about whether it’s Monday, he doesn’t worry about whether it’s an election year. He simply says, if a business is worth a dollar and I can buy it for 40 cents, something good may happen to me. And he does it over and over and over again. He owns many more stocks than I do — and is far less interested in the underlying nature of the business; I don’t seem to have very much influence on Walter. That’s on
e of his strengths; no on
e has much influence on him.

The second case is Tom Knapp, who also worked at Graham-Newman with me. Tom was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war; when he came back from the war, he was a beach bum. And then on
e day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Columbia. Tom took it on a noncredit basis, and he got so interested in the subject from taking that course that he came up and enrolled at Columbia Business School, where he got the MBA degree. He took Dodd’s course again, and took Ben Graham’s course. Incidentally, 35 years later I called Tom to ascertain some of the facts involved here and I found him on the beach again. The on
ly difference is that now he owns the beach!

In 1968, Tom Knapp and Ed Anderson, also a Graham disciple, along with on
e or two other fellows of similar persuasion, formed Tweedy, Browne Partners, and their investment results appear in Table 2. Tweedy, Browne built that record with very wide diversification. They occasionally bought control of businesses, but the record of the passive investments is equal to the record of the control investments.

Table 3 describes the third member of the group who formed Buffett Partnership in 1957. The best thing he did was to quit in 1969. Since then, in a sense, Berkshire Hathaway has been a continuation of the partnership in some respects. There is no single index I can give you that I would feel would be a fair test of investment management at Berkshire. But I think that any way you figure it, it has been satisfactory.

Table 4 shows the record of the Sequoia Fund, which is managed by a man whom I met in 1951 in Ben Graham’s class, Bill Ruane. After getting out of Harvard Business School, he went to Wall Street. Then he realized that he needed to get a real business education so he came up to take Ben’s course at Columbia, where we met in early 1951. Bill’s record from 1951 to 1970, working with relatively small sums, was far better than average. When I wound up Buffett Partnership I asked Bill if he would set up a fund to handle all our partners, so he set up the Sequoia Fund. He set it up at a terrible time, just when I was quitting. He went right into the two-tier market and all the difficulties that made for comparative performance for value-oriented investors. I am happy to say that my partners, to an amazing degree, not on
ly stayed with him but added money, with the happy result shown here.

There’s no hindsight involved here. Bill was the on
ly person I recommended to my partners, and I said at the time that if he achieved a four-point-per-annum advantage over the Standard & Poor’s, that would be solid performance. Bill has achieved well over that, working with progressively larger sums of money. That makes things much more difficult. Size is the anchor of performance. There is no question about it. It doesn’t mean you can’t do better than average when you get larger, but the margin shrinks. And if you ever get so you’re managing two trillion dollars, and that happens to be the amount of the total equity valuation in the economy, don’t think that you’ll do better than average!

I should add that in the records we’ve looked at so far, throughout this whole period there was practically no duplication in these portfolios. These are men who select securities based on discrepancies between price and value, but they make their selections very differently. Walter’s largest holdings have been such stalwarts as Hudson Pulp & Paper and Jeddo Highland Coal and New York Trap Rock Company and all those other names that come instantly to mind to even a casual reader of the business pages. Tweedy Browne’s selections have sunk even well below that level in terms of name recognition. On the other hand, Bill has worked with big companies. The overlap among these portfolios has been very, very low. These records do not reflect on
e guy calling the flip and fifty people yelling out the same thing after him.

Table 5 is the record of a friend of mine who is a Harvard Law graduate, who set up a major law firm. I ran into him in about 1960 and told him that law was fine as a hobby but he could do better. He set up a partnership quite the opposite of Walter’s. His portfolio was concentrated in very few securities and therefore his record was much more volatile but it was based on the same discount-from-value approach. He was willing to accept greater peaks and valleys of performance, and he happens to be a fellow whose whole psyche goes toward concentration, with the results shown. Incidentally, this record belongs to Charlie Munger, my partner for a long time in the operation of Berkshire Hathaway. When he ran his partnership, however, his portfolio holdings were almost completely different from mine and the other fellows mentioned earlier.

Table 6 is the record of a fellow who was a pal of Charlie Munger’s — another non-business school type — who was a math major at USC. He went to work for IBM after graduation and was an IBM salesman for a while. After I got to Charlie, Charlie got to him. This happens to be the record of Rick Guerin. Rick, from 1965 to 1983, against a compounded gain of 316 percent for the S&P, came off with 22,200 percent, which probably because he lacks a business school education, he regards as statistically significant.

On
e sidelight here: it is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately to people or it doesn’t take at all. It’s like an inoculation. If it doesn’t grab a person right away, I find that you can talk to him for years and show him records, and it doesn’t make any difference. They just don’t seem able to grasp the concept, simple as it is. A fellow like Rick Guerin, who had no formal education in business, understands immediately the value approach to investing and he’s applying it five minutes later. I’ve never seen anyone who became a gradual convert over a ten-year period to this approach. It doesn’t seem to be a matter of IQ or academic training. It’s instant recognition, or it is nothing.

Table 7 is the record of Stan Perlmeter. Stan was a liberal arts major at the University of Michigan who was a partner in the advertising agency of Bozell & Jacobs. We happened to be in the same building in Omaha. In 1965 he figured out I had a better business than he did, so he left advertising. Again, it took five minutes for Stan to embrace the value approach.

Perlmeter does not own what Walter Schloss owns. He does not own what Bill Ruane owns. These are records made
independently
. But every time Perlmeter buys a stock it’s because he’s getting more for his money than he’s paying. That’s the on
ly thing he’s thinking about. He’s not looking at quarterly earnings projections, he’s not looking at next year’s earnings, he’s not thinking about what day of the week it is, he doesn’t care what investment research from any place says, he’s not interested in price momentum, volume, or anything. He’s simply asking: what is the business worth?

Table 8 and Table 9 are the records of two pension funds I’ve been involved in. They are not selected from dozens of pension funds with which I have had involvement; they are the on
ly two I have influenced. In both cases I have steered them toward value-oriented managers. Very, very few pension funds are managed from a value standpoint. Table 8 is the Washington Post Company’s Pension Fund. It was with a large bank some years ago, and I suggested that they would do well to select managers who had a value orientation.

As you can see, overall they have been in the top percentile ever since they made the change. The Post told the managers to keep at least 25 percent of these funds in bonds, which would not have been necessarily the choice of these managers. So I’ve included the bond performance simply to illustrate that this group has no particular expertise about bonds. They wouldn’t have said they did. Even with this drag of 25 percent of their fund in an area that was not their game, they were in the top percentile of fund management. The Washington Post experience does not cover a terribly long period but it does represent many investment decisions by three managers who were not identified retroactively.

Table 9 is the record of the FMC Corporation fund. I don’t manage a dime of it myself but I did, in 1974, influence their decision to select value-oriented managers. Prior to that time they had selected managers much the same way as most larger companies. They now rank number on
e in the Becker survey of pension funds for their size over the period of time subsequent to this “conversion” to the value approach. Last year they had eight equity managers of any duration beyond a year. Seven of them had a cumulative record better than the S&P. The net difference now between a median performance and the actual performance of the FMC fund over this period is $243 million. FMC attributes this to the mindset given to them about the selection of managers. Those managers are not the managers I would necessarily select but they have the common denominators of selecting securities based on value.

So these are nine records of “coin-flippers” from Graham-and-Doddsville. I haven’t selected them with hindsight from among thousands. It’s not like I am reciting to you the names of a bunch of lottery winners — people I had never heard of before they won the lottery. I selected these men years ago based upon their framework for investment decision-making. I knew what they had been taught and additionally I had some personal knowledge of their intellect, character, and temperament. It’s very imp
ortant to understand that this group has assumed far less risk than average; note their record in years when the general market was weak. While they differ greatly in style, these investors are, mentally,
always buying the business, not buying the stock
. A few of them sometimes buy whole businesses. Far more often they simply buy small pieces of businesses. Their attitude, whether buying all or a tiny piece of a business, is the same. Some of them hold portfolios with dozens of stocks; others concentrate on a handful. But all exploit the difference between the market price of a business and its intrinsic value.

I’m convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a “herd” on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.

I would like to say on
e imp
ortant thing about risk and reward. Sometimes risk and reward are correlated in a positive fashion. If someone were to say to me, “I have here a six-shooter and I have slipped on
e cartridge into it. Why don’t you just spin it and pull it on
ce? If you survive, I will give you $1million."Iwoulddecline--perhapsstatingthat$1 million is not enough. Then he might offer me $5 million to pull the trigger twice — now that would be a positive correlation between risk and reward!

The exact opposite is true with value investing. If you buy a dollar bill for 60 cents, it’s riskier than if you buy a dollar bill for 40 cents, but the expectation of reward is greater in the latter case. The greater the potential for reward in the value portfolio, the less risk there is.

On
e quick example: The Washington Post Company in 1973 was selling for $80millioninthemarket.Atthetime,thatday,youcouldhavesoldtheassetstoanyoneoftenbuyersfornotlessthan$400 million, probably appreciably more. The company owned the
Post
,
Newsweek
, plus several television stations in major markets. Those same properties are worth $2billionnow,sothepersonwhowouldhavepaid$400 million would not have been crazy.

Now, if the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40millioninsteadof$80 million, its beta would have been greater. And to people that think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never been able to figure out why it’s riskier to buy $400millionworthofpropertiesfor$40 million than $80million.And,asamatteroffact,ifyoubuyagroupofsuchsecuritiesandyouknowanythingatallaboutbusinessvaluation,thereisessentiallynoriskinbuying$400 million for $80million,particularlyifyoudoitbybuyingten$40 million piles of $8millioneach.Sinceyoudo{n}^{\prime }thaveyourhandsonthe$400 million, you want to be sure you are in with honest and reasonably competent people, but that’s not a difficult job.

You also have to have the knowledge to enable you to make a very general estimate about the value of the underlying businesses. But you do not cut it close. That is what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety. You don’t try and buy businesses worth $83millionfor$80 million. You leave yourself an enormous margin. When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you on
ly drive 10,000 pound trucks across it. And that same principle works in investing.

In conclusion, some of the more commercially minded among you may wonder why I am writing this article. Adding many converts to the value approach will perforce narrow the spreads between price and value. I can on
ly tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote
Security Analysis
, yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years that I’ve practiced it. There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult. The academic world, if anything, has actually backed away from the teaching of value investing over the last 30 years. It’s likely to continue that way. Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.

Tables 1-9 follow:

[Note: the tables Buffett mentions are in
The Intelligent Investor
, but are not reproduced here. The Sequoia and Munger records are published
here
.]

If you have a high-speed internet connection, you may prefer to read
this version
of the speech (a 1.6 MB .pdf file), which has all of the tables.

评论

• 方胜 (2015-06-28 14:09): 今天把这篇演讲的中文翻译又重新看了一遍，巴菲特例举的九个案例中评判的时间跨度：9年一个；13-19年七个，是买下整个公司的思维；而且证明了很多人认为买股票一定要看所谓的行业、某某概念、只买小市值等等都是一些教条；关键是要“懂”，买价低于未来现金流折现，且有相当的折让。当下A股中的人们，大多数人的思维方式是牛市来了捞一把，今天买了股票，盼望明天大涨。
• 匿名 (2010-04-02 21:41): 段先生，你怎么看待国内的创业潮，我觉得中国太疯狂了，本人觉得马云、史玉柱等都不是给社会带来正面影响的企业家，特别是史玉柱，他卖的都是一些没什么用的产品。唉，中国为什么成长得这么畸形？
  • 茶水铺 (2010-04-02 23:28): 史玉柱的产品，我大概调查看看了，他的黄金搭档还是不错的，特别对于老年人睡眠问题，不信你去百度一下。
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 03:49): 呵呵，我不知道你心目中的社会正面是什么样子的 。 我猜你大概没用过史玉柱的任何产品吧？没用过你为什么说没用呢？ 本人用过一些，觉得还行啊。 一个东西如果能卖10年8年还卖的不错，一般都是有道理的，不要简单地人云亦云啊。
  • xlli777 → 段永平 (2010-04-06 10:34): 最起码史玉柱的广告给中国现代文化做出了巨大贡献 ，我们Rochester 08年的中秋晚会上，我和一个同学模仿脑白金的老头老太太跳舞唱歌，台下都快笑炸了
  • On the way → 茶水铺 (2010-11-07 16:06): 您确定黄金搭档能解决老年人睡眠问题吗？我正想给我妈买点东西让她睡的要点。。
  • 茶水铺 → On the way (2010-11-11 22:22): 不好意思，因为工作原因很少上网，网上我看到不少的人说可以解决一下睡眠问题，我没用过。
• gregnie (2010-04-02 20:14): 段大叔，你好，我是07年初才开始接触股市的新股民，由于天性谨慎，虽然07年没赚什么钱，但躲过了08年的暴跌，09年初的时候，我也买了GE，买入价格是11块左右，其实我对GE的业务并不懂，但是我想，GE是举世公认的好公司，虽然巴菲特买的是优先股，转换成股票的价格是$22.25，但是我的买入价是老巴的转换价格的一半，以这样的价位买入准错不了，赚钱的概率肯定很高，于是就重仓买入了一直到现在还没卖。 前天无意中发现了您的博客，于是贪婪地把所有文章和评论全部看了一遍，发现你在卖GE买YAHOO，于是这几天一直在关注这件事情，下面是我的一些非常初浅的看法，难免会有幼稚之处，还请见谅。 alibaba香港上市公司的股票高达69倍的PE，792亿HKD的市值，是不是太贵了？ 互联网企业的特点都是赢家通吃，注定了投资互联网企业都是高风险高收益，5年前YAHOO仅投资阿里巴巴$10亿美元换得40%的股份，反观当年的评论，很多人认为阿里巴巴占了大便宜，可是谁能预料到如今这10亿美元的投资的价值已经比YAHOO自身主营业务更值钱了？自从GOOGLE出现之后，YAHOO的市场份额便迅速缩小，五年后会是什么样的状况实在是难以预料，yahoo一年的盈利10亿以上的估计是否过于乐观？毕竟互联网企业的盈利膨胀和萎缩的速度是传统行业无法相比的, YAHOO在搜索方面兵败如山倒，在内容方面的竞争优势又能维持多久？
  • gregnie → gregnie (2010-04-02 20:26): YAHOO日本由于不了解，不知道该如何估值，但是YAHOO中国由于在国内的位置很尴尬，搜索方面比不过G00G和百度，内容方面比不过新浪，一直在持续亏损，马云已经投入了数亿进去了，但像投进了无底洞一样不见起色，像3721之类，已经看不到几个人在用了。
  • gregnie → gregnie (2010-04-02 20:27): 淘宝排名前几位的消费品类，比如服装、化妆品、消费电子、母婴用品、珠宝首饰，都有对应的独立B2C平台——VANCL、红孩子、京东商城、新蛋网、钻石小鸟、珂兰钻石网等，这些平台由于没有竞价机制，产品品牌更为突出，单价都比淘宝同类商品要高，由于淘宝上的刷荣誉的现象很多，假货也多，售后服务也无法保障，退货很难（淘宝上的很多商家，在你要买东西时，把你当成上帝，当你买回家比较长时间之后，由于无法影响其信誉评价，如果产品出现质量问题再找他们时，你在他们眼里就是孙子了，想退货，没门），这些都是淘宝的短板，虽然淘宝上的价格便宜，但是需要花很多时间和精力去寻找才能称心如意，互联网上的用户，忠诚度很低，只要是有替代选择，在价格相差不大的情况下，如果能买的放心，我相信会有越来越多的人会选择在那些B2C的平台上购物，特别是价格比较高的贵重商品。
  • gregnie → gregnie (2010-04-02 20:29): 虽然马云推出了淘宝商城，但是淘宝商城里的商家，和小店一样，良莠不齐，很多象浙江义务小商品市场那样的商家，也在商城注册，但产品质量并不很好。有个朋友有一段时间专买商城的产品，对比下来，普通商品并不比一般商家有什么优势，服务也有点店大欺客，贵重商品买商城的就是买个放心，其实和普通商家也差不多。
  • gregnie → gregnie (2010-04-02 20:31): 淘宝商城的商家是分散的，淘宝对于大件商品的售前、售后都没有控制能力和保障机制，这一点和京东、新蛋等比起来，是天生的短板；
  • gregnie → gregnie (2010-04-02 20:36): 淘宝虽然是和支付宝绑定在一起的，买家们都比较放心，但是支付宝的退款条款比较复杂，大件商品出现问题的时候，起到的作用不大。
  • gregnie → gregnie (2010-04-02 20:37): 淘宝商城只是淘宝的VIP客户，其实还是一样的，都是散户，交了保护费得到了淘宝的优待而已。 我个人觉得，淘宝现在面临的最大潜在威胁不是百度的有啊，腾讯的拍拍，EBAY的易趣，而是象亚马逊、VANCL、红孩子、京东商城、新蛋网、钻石小鸟、珂兰钻石网等这类B2C的专业网站瓜分它的市场份额，如果你是马云，你会如何应对？ 另外，政策风险也是淘宝必须要面临的比较大的风险，游戏规则一旦变化，形势可能逆转。目前政府已经开始介入个人电子商务经营这一领域了，上次北京工商局的动作背后肯定有国家工商局的支持。工商系统只是第一步，走稳之后税务机关也要出马了。央行对支付宝下手估计也是早晚的事。
  • gregnie → gregnie (2010-04-02 20:37): 请看今天的新闻：央行将推"超级网银" 支付宝或被禁接入网银系统 http://news.163.com/10/0402/09/638O0JFU0001124J.html 核心提示：据悉，网银互联应用系统或将于今年8月份上线运行。该网银互联应用系统可谓“超级网银”，能提供跨行实时的资金汇划、跨行账户和账务查询，以及跨行扣款、第三方支付、第三方预授权等业务功能。知情人士透露，支付宝等第三方支付平台或被暂停接入网银互联系统。 中国改革开放这么多年，却并没有产生过几个像样的跨国企业，GOOG退出中国，劣币驱逐良币，这次央行的动作，我觉得对支付宝的前途会有很大的影响，你认为呢？
  • 乐了 → gregnie (2010-04-02 20:55): 你真能写啊 打这么多字
  • 段永平 → gregnie (2010-04-03 02:19): 我要好好看看。
  • 段永平 → gregnie (2010-04-03 03:41): 我晕，刚刚打了半天，不小心就不见了。 前段时间yhoo比ge高的时候，我在一个满仓的账号上换了一些yhoo到ge，现在换回来，好玩而已，不然老没事干 。 我买yahoo的原因和买ge的原因其实是一样的，就是觉得他们的企业文化很强大，日后必有所成。只不过在yahoo这看好的是阿里巴巴而已。当然，现在的yahoo我觉得也还行，现在的CEO做事的方法我更能理解一些。 你的贴我都看了，你的担心我也都知道，谢谢啊 过个3-5年我们就都明白了 反正我们都有的是时间 。
  • 段永平 → gregnie (2010-04-03 08:02): 呵呵，看过了。这个问题不怕，早晚会解决的。因为超级网银代替不了支付宝的功能。为了和谐，最后还是要用支付宝的 。
  • gregnie → 段永平 (2010-04-03 10:00): 我听说当初马云为了搞支付宝，很多银行反对的，后来马云和银行达成了一个协议，就是承诺不用支付宝里的钱做投资及其它一些对银行的利益有影响的业务，这个协议是不是限制了支付宝的发展？您如何看？ 另外我想请您推荐一些美国的券商，破产风险低的，接受中国身份开户的，因为我现在是用香港花旗银行来买美国股票，单向交易收取0.5%的佣金，一买一卖就要花掉1%了，好黑啊。 谢谢了！
  • 段永平 → gregnie (2010-04-03 14:18): 美国有很多discount broker，一个交易只收5-9块美金，不管多少股。但可能你要到美国开户。在香港开的多数都是full commission的。
  • 盛世天空 → gregnie (2010-04-03 17:46): 嘉信理財 http://chinese.schwab.com/public/schwab-us-zh網上交易 $8.95 E*TRADE: https://us.etrade.com/e/t/home網上交易股票$9.99 盈透证券集团http://www.interactivebrokers.com/cn/main.php TD AMERITRADE:http://www.tdameritrade.com 史考特https://chinese.scottrade.com/www/index.aspx?supbid=82244 以上四家我都用过，盈透证券还没用过
  • 高山流水 → gregnie (2010-04-03 21:42): 不错啊，对中国电子商务很了解， 我也要好好学习学习。
  • kesituolani → gregnie (2010-04-04 00:52): 明显是太贵了，互联网这种，还没有什么商业规矩，走到哪一步触碰到哪些障碍那些管制还不知道。只有风投资金才适合参与，这些钱也只有风投资金才该赚哈。以前有个名词叫“市梦率”。互联网企业就是“市梦率”，他朝梦醒何处，不得而知哈。
• 周骥 (2010-04-02 16:35): 段老师：一直想请教一个问题。 为了能在0.6元价格买到1元价值的机会出现时，可以迅速下手,必须时常性保持现金，极度耐心的等待吗？这个阶段，是最考验人的贪欲本性d的时段吗？谢谢！
  • 周骥 → 周骥 (2010-04-02 17:33): 这个问题问的好，我也有这种迷惑。比如一年都没有机会碰到，那我要不操作就会感觉没有成就感了。好像一年在投资上没做什事。但为了操作而操作，又可能价格比安全边际高。 我还想问段总，我作为一个非职业投资人，想知道像段总和其他段总见到的好的价值投资者，那种职业的投资人，日常都做什么？以前看滚雪球，巴老是看报表呀，财经新闻，杂志，报道。。。我理解巴老通过这些学习关注公司的同时也是在拓展自己了解的领域，就像段总对电子产品最熟悉，但相对的上市公司可能每年不多，如果只盯着自己熟悉和了解的，可能没有多少上市公司可看，肯定要扩展自己的知识到其他领域，那这种扩展是根据自己的兴趣和特长吗？或者行业前景？
  • 段永平 → 周骥 (2010-04-03 02:32): 其实也就是巴菲特干的那些事。
  • 段永平 → 周骥 (2010-04-03 02:36): 我觉得对所谓价值投资者而言，其实没有那么考验。他们也就是没有合适的东西就不买了，有合适的再买，就和一般人逛商场一样。我想每个人逛商场时一定不会把花光身上所有钱作为目标吧.
  • cunrenatca → 段永平 (2010-04-03 03:09): GRAHAM把投资和投机解释的很清楚：投资行为是保守的，静态的；投机行为是动态的，主动出击的。其实只是形态上的不同并不涵盖褒贬，只不过人们总在思想上不断混同，非要搞清什么是投资什么是投机，或者说哪个好哪个不好，其实最主要应该搞清自己在做什么。对风险的预期和对事物发展的判断能力是跟每个人的成长环境，经历或阅历分不开的。
  • 段永平 → cunrenatca (2010-04-03 04:36): 呵呵，这个解释很好。有点汗，从来没看过Graham的东西。
  • cunrenatca → 段永平 (2010-04-03 04:45): 嘿嘿，我也还没啃完他老人家的著作呢
  • 静听花开 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 08:51): 谢谢段总，太经典了，这样一讲大家就非常明白了，逛商场时看见自己喜欢的商品打折销售的时候我们才会去买，不会为了花钱而买商品的，股票也是一样的道理，呵呵。买股票就譬如在商场里买商品
  • 静听花开 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 08:55): 在商场里大家都知道钱的宝贵，只有睦到觉得物有所值的商品才会去买，可到了股票市场里好像钱就不是钱了，就一定要把钱花光换成股票才觉得是赚钱了，呵呵，投资股票就是商场购物一样的简单
  • 大地 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 17:15): 这是一个好易明白的比喻: 买股票如逛商场买东西一样,买合适的东西,不合适的不买.也不会把钱花光再回向
  • 大地 → cunrenatca (2010-04-03 17:20): 我也没有看完呢,惭愧, 先学一点用一点.比如说,不借钱投资,先把这一点用起来.不要有贪心. 投资自己搞得懂的,不懂的先不要急乱投, 善知识的话,几乎每句都有用,但要用到自己这儿,就要真正依着运用了,
  • 高山流水 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 21:57): 持有现金等待机会的时间，如何产生少量的收益（不输给通货膨胀率），除了购买债券，还有没有其他的品种。 无风险套利，段总常用吗？巴老在这方面还能获得不错的收益。
  • kesituolani → 段永平 (2010-04-04 00:45): 也不是逛商场这样的吧？商场都是终端，买到的东东都是成品了只有使用价值了，而且商品上架的时候应该是其价格最高估的时候，此时进场买到的东西，不太能还高价转手卖给别人了吧哈？除非就真的只买不卖使用到底。但是买了不卖也不是价值投资吧哈？
  • 段永平 → 高山流水 (2010-04-04 02:25): 呵呵，我会用一下option去做类似的事情。
  • 茶水铺 → 段永平 (2010-04-04 21:15): 如果投资者要考验，怕有可能会出问题了。
  • 让心灵去旅行 → 段永平 (2010-04-04 21:43): 有理
  • heimaofuren → kesituolani (2010-04-05 00:15): 你理解的对吗
  • xlli777 → cunrenatca (2010-04-06 10:37): 格雷厄姆说的是防守投资者是静态的，企业投资者（Enterprise Investor，我也不知道怎么翻译贴切）是主动出击的。看完全书的感觉是他把自己归类为后者。
  • cunrenatca → xlli777 (2010-04-07 00:46): 再好好看吧，另外更正一下应该是Enterprising Investor.
  • 海冰 → kesituolani (2010-04-08 16:47): 商场都是终端，买到的东东都是成品了只有使用价值了 恩，投资者买股票也应该只关注价值，即便退市了仍能带来回报那样的
• art753 (2010-04-03 03:54): 巴老文章里关于BETA的华盛顿邮报案例说，“我从来都不明白，为什么以4千万来购买一个价值4亿元的资产，风险会比用8千万购买来的高。”非常认同。 困惑的是，当我遇到这样的机会时，万一它还跌到了2千万，此时我是否可以采用margin？ 请教段老师，巴老的警言“No Margin"，是属于道德规范还是技术范畴的？ （在此忏悔：去年我用类似的工具把净值搞到了10以上，罪过啊）
  • 段永平 → art753 (2010-04-03 04:39): No margin是安全范畴·。出来混总是要还的，用margin赚的钱大多最后都还回去了。要命的是很多人还得时候连本都没留住。
  • 段永平 → art753 (2010-04-03 13:51): good
  • 大地 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 17:13): 赞成! 借钱风险是很大的.
  • 盛世天空 → 大地 (2010-04-03 19:04): “Don't use margin！”指的是不要用股票抵押的方式向券商借钱。我宁愿去银行贷款，不是高手避免用margin，
  • 高山流水 → 盛世天空 (2010-04-03 21:31): 何为高手？巴老都不用margin。高手也不能用，我的理解。
  • 大地 → 盛世天空 (2010-04-04 00:13): 事实上向银行借钱,都是很有风险的, 我宁可不赚,不会借钱投资股票, 但若公司的生意上,订单增加时,需要加大投入时,会考虑银行借钱周转,
  • 段永平 → 盛世天空 (2010-04-04 02:15): 呵呵，是高手就不需要用margin。
  • art753 → 盛世天空 (2010-04-04 02:38): 您的想法我赞同，情愿把房子押上，也不要把价值4亿以上的华盛顿邮报作价2千万押来做margin. 无产阶级的思想是：失去的是锁链，得到的是全世界。摆明就是发穷恶，不能跟高手的处境比。
  • 盛世天空 → 大地 (2010-04-04 04:02): 买卖股票就是生意
  • 大地 → 盛世天空 (2010-04-04 13:47): 当然买卖股票是做生意,如果不是以做生意的形式,那就是在投机,赌博, 至于借钱投资股票,这要看在什么情况下,到处都是便宜股票的时候,也会适当的考虑,
  • 盛世天空 → 大地 (2010-04-04 14:16): 买卖股票目的只是赚钱， 买卖股票当然也 是一种投机,赌博， 只是 “ 赢者通吃 ”
  • 盛世天空 → 大地 (2010-04-04 17:23): 小心：有时候便宜没好货
  • 大地 → 盛世天空 (2010-04-05 12:10): 谢谢！
• 匿名 (2010-04-03 08:34): 段总,用PE来衡量一家公司准不准确,我感觉还是看公司经营的总体水平比较好,毕竟股价是不能预测的,总是觉得PE不靠谱,您认为对价值投资者来说用PE来计算准确吗?
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 14:12): PE是历史数据。
  • 高山流水 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 22:16): 段总一直强调PE是历史数据，只说了上半句，能否再深入解释一下，PE是估值时用的最重要的指标之一，段总轻描淡写的，不是太明白。
  • 泛舟池 (2010-04-04 01:11): 最准确的是 DCF ，即自由现金流折现，或称内在值。 段老师对内在值有很精辟的定义。 巴菲特曾反复说这是唯一合乎逻辑的估值方法。 可是对绝大多数投资者来说这也是最难的估值方法。 相比之下 PE 直观简便，人人爱用，不幸的是多数人掉进了 PE 陷阱:(
  • 泛舟池 → 泛舟池 (2010-04-04 01:13): 如果一定要用PE，可以试试下面的用法： 首先市盈率不能正着看，要倒着看。比如每股净利1块，股价20块，市盈率正着看是20/1=20。倒着看则是/20=0.05，意思是每股年收益率5%。 其次市盈率不能站着看而要走着看。否则投资人不如买长期国债，年均收益率也在5%上下，更安全。只有走着看才有理由买静态市盈率20倍的股票，因为增长率会增加收益率。 最终目标是选出几家确信预期收益率最高的放进篮子里……:)
  • 泛舟池 → 泛舟池 (2010-04-04 01:16): 更正笔误： 倒着看则是 1/20=0.05 只有走着看才有理由买静态市盈率20倍 以上 的股票
  • art753 → 泛舟池 (2010-04-04 02:17): 无论股票还是非上市公司，我也只采用唯一的办法：DCF. 请教泛先生，有些成长性特高的企业，您喜欢采用标准公式里含贴现风险项呢？还是采用巴老的办法：不用贴现风险项，只采用7%+3原则贴现，然后在买入的时候留下安全边际？ 感觉巴老的办法对中等增长性（25%以下）挺有效，只是好像对高增长性的容易失效。我这感觉对么？
  • 段永平 → 高山流水 (2010-04-04 02:32): PE是历史数据的意思是你不能单靠PE去推测公司未来的收益，不然会中招的。举个例子，GM（通用汽车）的PE一直都很低（以前老在5倍左右），但债务很高，结果破产了。
  • 泛舟池 → art753 (2010-04-04 02:43): 不错哦:) 我既用风险贴现率又保留安全边际。 巴老不加风险贴现率是因为他中后期已不投有风险的公司，至少在筛选公司时只选他认为没有风险的公司。这座桥要么能过要么不能过，危险的桥就算买了保险也不能过，这就是他老人家的逻辑。 巴老追求确定性，而高增长的公司往往处于青少年时期，不够确定。这类公司往往盘子也较小，装不下巴老的资金。我个人反倒偏爱这类公司，可能和盘子小有关系:)
  • 泛舟池 → 泛舟池 (2010-04-04 02:54): 当然还要看看段老师提到的负债率，我个人偏爱低负债、零负债的公司。还要看看资本开支，有不少公司是资本黑洞，利润只是纸上富贵。有些公司多年以来全部利润再投入都不够，还要增发或举债，我会避开此类公司，哪怕利润表很漂亮:)
  • 段永平 → art753 (2010-04-04 02:55): 我也不知道我用的是什么办法，但你说的对我来讲好像有点复杂 。
  • 段永平 → 泛舟池 (2010-04-04 02:59): 我也尽量避开。 GE对我来讲是个例外，但GE的负债有点像银行的负债。 我还在思考这个问题。
  • art753 → 泛舟池 (2010-04-04 03:04): 谢谢大哥的夸奖，也谢谢段老师这个博群，让俺解惑很多。 段老师已经是有道之人，带徒儿入门即可。艺和技还是麻烦您老哥： 我也是偏好高成长性，也是采用风险贴现加安全边际。具体而言比如在澳门威尼斯人(LVS),我获得private wire去买对子，中对子一赔11.可以肯定的是,private wire表明有一半的机会可以中，于是采用凯利原则进行投注。 问题是：已经连续中了两次对子，private wire表明仍然还有一半中对子的机会，是否可以理解为，前两次中的对子里的风险贴现项不仅不是风险，还成为了额外利润了？
  • 泛舟池 → art753 (2010-04-04 03:11): 概率的乘法结果是连续两次得手比一次得手的概率低，连续三次就更低了。我实际试过，的确如此。 出门，回头再聊:)
  • art753 → 段永平 (2010-04-04 04:49): 古田会议到遵义会议也就短短6年，之后的15年就全资控股了华夏大地。估计毛主席也不太喜欢用数学，这也是俺们喜欢来段老师的博群之魅力之处。
  • 段永平 → art753 (2010-04-04 05:22):
  • 茶水铺 → 段永平 (2010-04-04 21:10): 看来段总做不了学者，虽然你的东西简单而有用。
  • 段永平 → 茶水铺 (2010-04-05 07:57): 呵呵，当个好学者比我难多了 。
• 茶水铺 (2010-04-03 01:21): 巴菲特说关于价值投资“它要不然就是马上被领悟，不然就是永远都不明白。”这句话我深有感触，我最早看的是巴菲特老师写的那本大头书《证券分析》看到一段文字，马上就觉得有戏了。我也说过价值投资给别人听，但有些人就是说不明白，甚至很聪明的人，段总你知道为什么吗？（不知道答案是不是假如我知道了，我就不是做价值投资了 ）
  • 段永平 → 茶水铺 (2010-04-03 04:32): 我觉得不明白的人可能根本就没有去悟，所以悟不出来很正常。可能有点像说服一个喜欢打拖拉机的人去打桥牌，看起来都是牌，实际上是很不同的游戏 。（桥牌的运气成分非常小）
  • 茶水铺 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 15:10): 有道理，他们也比较爱找理由。
  • 高山流水 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 22:06): 个人理解： 各人有各人的选择，各有各的爱好，他有他的乐趣，生活方式不同。 正是有投机的存在，股价才会大范围波动，投资的才有机会，要感谢投机的人才对。
  • 茶水铺 → 高山流水 (2010-04-04 20:43):
• 道 (2010-04-04 14:18): “哈，我也希望30年后发现全中国会投资的200只猴子里有50只曾经常来这个博客” 哈，好像有点贪心！
• 匿名 (2010-04-04 01:11): 段总,这篇文章我看了好几遍,发现有点矛盾.巴菲特说股票的市价是不合理的,和实际的价值是有偏差的.那么这里的不合理是短期还是长期的,如果是长期的话,无论它的价值是好还是坏,那么一个公司的实际价值不是永远没办法在股市上得到体现?那我们这些投资者怎么能从股市上获利呢?望指教,谢谢!
  • 段永平 (2010-04-04 02:52): 我觉得巴菲特说的是时点问题。就是说在某个时点，股价总是不合理的，可能高了，也可能低了。有点像马克思说的“价格总是围绕价值上下波动”。我比较喜欢马克思说的这句话。 你如果能想想一个非上市公司是否有价值（或价值是否能体现）可能就能明白你想问的问题。
  • 段永平 (2010-04-04 03:40): 恩,“价格总是围绕价值上下波动”。是金子总会发光的!第二段您的意思是不是说就算市价再低或者再高,也不会影响其公司最终所能创造的利润,换句话说就是投资人就算不从股市获利,我们从它所创的利润中也可以获利?
  • 盛世天空 → 段永平 (2010-04-04 04:49): 我觉得股票是公司向市场凑款的工具，股票本身是没什么价值的。就算公司有点价值，如果股票大户不买这公司，股票照样不会升。 股票是一种群众运动，当买股票者对公司充满希望，大量买进时，股票一定要升起来，还要升的很高，才能把大量股民钱套住。。。
• art753 (2010-04-04 03:36): 很虔诚地请教段老师一个企业问题： 我16年前创立的一个企业还幸运地活到了今天，我也希望它将来成为一个社会人而不是一个私有财产。问题是它明显地走向了保守，逐渐在丧失它创造的激情。能给我的选择是: A.天要下雨娘要嫁人随它去吧，都16岁了也不是小孩了。 B.搞个文化小革命，或许它还能给社会多些贡献，只是既累了自己也累了同事。 哪个选择更像是做正确的事呢？
• 匿名 (2010-04-02 21:25): 段老师您好最近发现您的博客有更新很高兴，按辈分我都可以叫你叔叔了，我当初也是无意中看到巴菲特的书（07年吧），觉得比较容易理解后来就一直学习关于巴菲特方面的知识，在美国生活比较习惯 ，还是在中国生活比较习惯啊，我是09年在网上了解到您也有做投资才认识您的，我喜欢你以前小霸王公司的名字所以就用小霸王做我的QQ名称了，我也投资了一些钱买股票，我平时喜欢看一下刘建位老师关于巴菲特的文章，不知您认识他吗。
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 03:42): 不认识，有空去看看 。
  • 茶水铺 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 15:37): 段总你转的那篇《巴菲特忠告：简单胜复杂》，就是他写的。
  • 高山流水 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 22:09): 只看巴老、段总的，其他不看，够用了。
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 22:54): 段老师您好可以在这里发表一些关于巴菲特的文章以及投资案例吗
  • 段永平 → 茶水铺 (2010-04-04 02:02):
  • 段永平 (2010-04-04 02:34): 巴菲特的东西网上到处都是。我有时会拿些来，平时你自己也可以上网找或到书店里找 。
• 匿名 (2010-04-02 18:28): 段老师.您会不会想您投资一个公司.别人为什么会低价卖给你.你又为什么可以高价卖出去.这个问题?这是不是一种投机的心理啊?
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 02:30): 呵呵，这个问题很有趣。 实际上，我买的时候是不考虑是不是有人从我手里买的。我要假设如果这不是个上市企业这个价钱我还买不买。你如果明白这点了，价值投资的最基本的概念就有了，反之亦然。
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 03:28): 段总的概念竟然我以前也想过,荣幸
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 09:06): 段老师.你了解一个企业是不是更多的去了解一些.不在财务报表上看到的东西.我是说一种感受.如企业文化.软性.无形的东西.我提这个问题是不是因为我还不知道它们是相互应证的关系啊.
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 14:14): 不一定啊。需要啥了解啥，或者叫啥没搞懂就去了解啥。
  • 大地 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 17:08): 如果这不是个上市企业这个价钱我还买不买。你如果明白这点了，价值投资的最基本的概念就有了 赞叹,我现在有意的训练自已,在进股票前,问自己,如果不是上市企业,这个价钱,还买不买,如果买,就可以买,如果不买,现在也不要买 谢谢
  • 海冰 (2010-04-03 17:28): 这个巴菲特用格雷厄姆提出的市场先生做出了很好的解释，不服不行，市场先生就是这么拽 所以我们有做的就是在自己的能力圈内作出价格与价值的判断
  • yinhoupeng → 段永平 (2010-04-03 21:36): 买股票就是买公司，呵呵。大道至简-------- 段大哥你说过做投资的两个重要方面：钱的问题和做正确的投资。对于我来说感觉自己做正确的投资这个问题可以过关。但钱的量的问题长期是一个问题。段大哥对于我这种形式的投资者有什么建议呢？
  • 高山流水 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 21:48): 投机的人给了段总机会
  • 段永平 → yinhoupeng (2010-04-04 02:24): 钱的量的问题短期可能会有点麻烦，长期就不应该是问题了。 我的建议就是慢慢来。慢就是快。
• 匿名 (2010-04-03 16:34): 请问段先生： 如何理解一个好企业（符合价值投资理念）的老板或CEO的价值？人的因素与产品的因素哪个更大？谢谢。 好文章，每次看到，都会有不同的感受。
  • 段永平 (2010-04-04 02:02): 从5年10年的角度看，CEO至关重要。从10-50年的角度看董事会很重要，因为董事会能找出好的CEO。从更长的角度看企业文化更重要，因为一个好的企业文化可以维持有一个好的董事会。GE就是一个好例子。 好的公司之所以是好的公司，必然会有些好的产品。但所谓好的产品的寿命是非常有限的。 所谓好的生意模式可以让好的产品的寿命大幅度提高。
• 大地 (2010-04-03 00:08): 赞叹段老师和其他的价值投资者的先行者, 赞叹本博中段师的粉丝的悟性, 惭愧自己的悟性很差,愿能透过段老师贴的这篇文章,能明白点什么叫价值投资 不要拉后脚,要是拉远了,兴趣就会减的,愿各位多帮助!
  • 段永平 → 大地 (2010-04-03 04:20): 这篇文章讲的实际上是个概率事件 ，工科出身的人可能容易懂。 我理解的大意就是，长期来看价值投资者赚到钱其实不是运气！
  • 大地 → 段永平 (2010-04-04 00:13): 赞成!
• fongysh (2010-04-03 22:51): 亲爱的段总啊,国内的投资者有福了……这样交流多亲切啊……
• inter (2010-04-03 22:11): 这里是很好学习园地，感谢段总、感谢各位未来的猴子！
• 匿名 (2010-04-02 21:32): 真好,大需要这样的指点,
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 03:43): 好像少了一点
  • 大地 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 17:03): 惭愧,太需要这样的指点,一字之差,投资不能马虎,学习也是, 赞叹
  • 高山流水 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 22:00):
• yinhoupeng (2010-04-03 21:48): 买股票就是买公司，呵呵。大道至简-------- 段大哥你说过做投资的两个重要方面：钱的问题和做正确的投资。对于我来说感觉自己做正确的投资这个问题可以过关。但钱的量的问题长期是一个问题。段大哥对于我这种形式的投资者有什么建议呢？
• 茶水铺 (2010-04-03 15:50): 段总说过关于借钱的事情，说到如果不好意思，连闹僵的机会都没有。记得我小时候借给人家买冰棍的钱，现在还收不回来，已经成为坏账了，当时就是不好意思不借啊，就当请他吃啦。
• 匿名 (2010-04-03 14:51): 博主，有没有考虑过将现有的美元资产换成人民币计价的资产？毕竟人民币要升值，是迟早的事啊。
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 15:46):
• 匿名 (2010-04-03 13:07): 段总你好，我看到你说你看懂了中石油，能不能说说你怎么看懂的？它的价值怎么看出来？
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 14:11): 老巴都说过了。
• 粤小散 (2010-04-02 20:38): 以买下一单生意的想法去买股票，可以从整个公司余下生命周期所能创造的价值、所能产生的盈利来衡量现价购买值不值，相比于只盯着近年的市盈率、利润总额、利润增长幅度等指标的思维模式，来得更全面、更准确。这是我读后第一点体会。以后读指标可能没那么机械理解了，会有一个清晰的目标和教全面的视野，尽管很多东西是无法看清楚的，但是，起码减少了读指标的盲目性和机械性。 感觉到文章其实涉及到价值投资的好几个方面，虽然有些只是三言两语提及。下来自己再慢慢学习和体会。 自己还没入门，接下来还要好好学习。 谢谢博主的一片诚意。
  • 粤小散 → 粤小散 (2010-04-02 21:03): 第二个感悟是，价值投资并没有固定的模式和规定的做法，每个人都可以用自己独有的方式做价值投资。
  • 段永平 → 粤小散 (2010-04-03 02:18): 其实我的理解也就是如此。 我当年从巴菲特那儿学到的东西就是这些，而且我觉得就够了。 剩下的必须自己去学，比如怎么了解一个企业等等，好像没有一个一句话能教会的办法。
  • 粤小散 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 09:13): 明白！一定要认认真真学习！感谢段总回复，很开心！
• 匿名 (2010-04-03 06:04): 您有没有买中石油,我认为他们的生意不错,您怎么看,给点建议吧!
  • 匿名 (2010-04-03 06:44): 随便现在的价位比较高,如果跌到50您考虑吗
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 06:55): 我不了解A股的股票。
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 07:05): 也是,A股的公司不是很透明,但是有几家还是不错的,COME ON!
• 匿名 (2010-04-03 01:36): 感觉有点晕。个人似乎对抛硬币这个正反二选一，概率五五开的可靠性存有多少的疑问，因为这个貌似在逻辑上无法确证。但只因“天在做，人在看”，所以只能强迫自己相信哈。又比如奥巴马与麦凯恩，同样二选一，但“人在做，天在看”，所以就不是五五开。而另一个例子，比如婴儿出生，非男即女，又见二选一，固然人在做，或者其实天也在做？相信人定胜天吗是否也就五五开吗？玄之又玄，感觉又要晕倒了哈。
  • kesituolani (2010-04-03 01:47): 老来得子酬谢神恩的多了。莫非不计较子女得失的算投资，一定渴求得男丁的算投机？段总是否也这感觉啊哈。
  • 段永平 (2010-04-03 04:33): 去扔100万次就明白了
  • 段永平 → kesituolani (2010-04-03 04:34): 好像轮到我晕了 。
• 段永平 (2010-04-02 10:14): 哈，我也希望30年后发现全中国会投资的200只猴子里有50只曾经常来这个博客 。
  • 段永平 → 段永平 (2010-04-02 10:34): 希望我是其中的一只!
  • 水哥 → 段永平 (2010-04-02 11:08): 做投资脑子越用越灵.可眼睛越来越差. 30年后我们一定会来,但不知道到时候要用多大的放大镜 谢谢段老师的无私奉献,也请您保护好自己的眼睛!
  • northlight → 段永平 (2010-04-02 11:27): 哈哈 才200个啊 不知道有没有我奥 首先做到定期拜访宝地....
  • bnfan → 段永平 (2010-04-02 12:23): 顶。当个猴子不容易，当个会投资的猴子更不容易啊。
  • 老石 → 段永平 (2010-04-02 12:27): 那另外一百五十只，肯定会潜水来这里……
  • 科科 → 段永平 (2010-04-02 12:29): 段大哥:我想当那些猴子中的一个.我现在是每天来看看学学
  • zzj880324 → 段永平 (2010-04-02 12:43): 发现一个好地方，看了几天来段总和网友的坦率交流很受用，也想打扰一下，期望赐教。 用40美分买一美元纸币。现实中的困惑在确认股票的价值时，它的现值总是低于市值，即使在熊市好像也不好找，有时也只能作同比才能模糊的选择。如果以买下整个公司的意愿，是不是以国债利率为参考更好？对成长的股票适度放宽是否违背价值投资原则？
  • friend → 段永平 (2010-04-02 12:54): 成效显著。。。各位未来的猴子们。。有带头大哥了应该好好学习。了解。。最关键的是理解后要去实践。
  • cunrenatca → 段永平 (2010-04-02 12:57): 记得您说过的一句“谁不是从钱少过来的呢？”----贵在坚持
  • 段永平 → 段永平 (2010-04-02 21:37): 愿到那时自己还活着,打开博客时,说活着真好! 问发个信息,老段最近,牙齿还好么, 到那时会回忆,跟段老师学习一辈子了,感恩!
  • art753 → 段永平 (2010-04-02 22:43): 刚才找了10个硬币（9枚一元，1枚5角）各抛了20次，结果是102面正，98面反。中间过程还出现了正面领先10的局面。 小时候一直困惑这个fifty-fifty猜想，最近也特困惑高斯分布... 或许还是太懒了，下次要把硬币抛完2000次，再向各位汇报工作。
  • 茶水铺 → art753 (2010-04-02 23:26): 这个有意思，抛足够之间长的话，正反基本上持平。
  • 茶水铺 → 段永平 (2010-04-02 23:34): 那个时候估计在星球以外做投资了，科技的进步真的是不敢相信，即使搬到星球我也要常来段总的博客。
  • art753 → 茶水铺 (2010-04-02 23:40): 一定是这样吗？困惑ing 茶水铺 回复 art753 这个有意思，抛足够之间长的话，正反基本上持平。
  • 大地 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 00:04): 猴子?呵呵, 愿本人30年后,能是您希望中的一员,感恩段老师的指点,,先谢谢了 愿大家都能真正地学好投资,并运用成功, 更能学好人生价值的投资!
  • 茶水铺 → art753 (2010-04-03 01:07): 差不多，好像记得在哪里看过关于这个东西，巴菲特也提到过关于概率的问题。
  • 段永平 → 段永平 (2010-04-03 03:44):
  • 段永平 → art753 (2010-04-03 04:10): 呵呵，你有闲心啊。 你可能要扔100万次心理才有底
• 匿名 (2010-04-02 19:05): 段总，你好，我可不可以用邮箱发信问你个问题，如果可以，我怎么联系你？
  • 乐了 (2010-04-02 20:56): 阿段前面说过了，有问题就在这里问
  • 段永平 → 乐了 (2010-04-03 03:42):
• algor (2010-04-02 09:38): 段总，有关yahoo有个问题想咨询您。yahoo美国每年收益5～6亿美元有没有包括yahoo日本和香港上市的阿里巴巴的投资收益，还是仅仅是yahoo美国的本土收益；另外yahoo美国和微软的合作，每年收益估计为10亿美元的估计值概率大吗？多谢了。
  • 段永平 → algor (2010-04-02 10:09): 应该是没有的。你可以查查他们上季度的财报。
  • 段永平 → algor (2010-04-02 15:47): 好的，多谢段总。 另外和微软合作，对盈利的提高把握性怎么判断？
  • cunrenatca → 段永平 (2010-04-03 00:45): 季报里有对日本和阿里巴巴的收益写的很清楚
  • 段永平 → algor (2010-04-03 02:39): 和微软的合作只是帮他们省钱了。当然同时也可以帮他们Focus在他们自己擅长的东西上。
• 阿文 (2010-04-02 18:51): It doesn't seem to be a matter of IQ or academic training. It's instant recognition, or it is nothing.。 --------------- instant recognition 是天生的么，段大侠？
  • 段永平 → 阿文 (2010-04-03 02:26): 我觉得可能是也可能不是
• 大地 (2010-04-02 23:49): 谢谢段老师! 正需要这样的学习! 不过惭愧自己的英文水平,还好有心人译过来了.感恩!
• shenzhenmonkey (2010-04-02 19:54): 来拜读段总的文章是每日必修课。
  • 科科 → shenzhenmonkey (2010-04-02 22:41): 看来你肯定是段大哥所说的30年后全中国会投资的200只猴子里的一个
• cn0425 (2010-04-02 07:55): 另外请教段总，我是刚毕业不久的MBA，远期目标是自己开公司，当下是要找家公司锻炼积累，打好铺垫，现在面临职业选择，未来规划的问题，如何平衡这期间的过程和结果，即效率和效果，希望段总给一点建议
  • cn0425 → cn0425 (2010-04-02 21:47): 有你这样出息的儿子,您的妈妈一定会很开心, 先跟母亲洗一个月的脚,以后就会知道了 呵呵,不是玩笑的玩笑
• 泛舟池 (2010-04-02 13:49): http://www.xxtz.com.cn/tszswz.htm 上面这个链接中有中文 还有巴氏部分信件和其他好文章的中文
  • 泛舟池 → 泛舟池 (2010-04-02 13:51): 因为文章是PDF格式，直接给文章的链接无法打开，不知何故，只好给了几十篇文章的链接，麻烦大家自己往下找吧，找错了也值，因为大都是巴氏的美文:)
  • bnfan → 泛舟池 (2010-04-02 14:32): 不错的网站，收藏了
• 泛舟池 (2010-04-02 13:57): 市场绝非持续有效，价值投资的实证优势就是证据:)
• 言弃不是男人 (2010-04-02 12:53): 我只希望不是第一只也不是最后一只，但是31年之后有我，也可以了
• 匿名 (2010-04-02 12:26): 已经有船环绕了地球一周，但相信“地球是平的”的人却会越来越多。这应该就是价值投资的价值所在。
• 匿名 (2010-04-02 11:46): 哈哈，算我一个
• Tim (2010-04-02 09:13): 我就没明白，怎么知道价值超过了价格？
• 匿名 (2010-04-02 08:52): 谢谢段老师。好好学习下。
• 匿名 (2010-04-02 06:19): 呵呵,你发的这片文章可能评论比较少了
  • 匿名 (2010-04-02 08:10): 可是，在我自己运用它的这35年期间，没有迹象显示人们正转向价值投资法。这也许是人类的本性吧，人们总喜欢把简单的事情复杂化。 这段最经典. 突然发现巴菲特的投资理念跟我是这样的相似!
  • northlight (2010-04-02 08:26): 如果市场的每一个参与者都是价值投资者，那么价值投资的机会是不是就少了很多，达到所谓“有效市场”状态？ 所以是不是要感谢这个容易被扭曲的世界？
  • northlight (2010-04-02 08:49): 呵呵,是的.巴菲特说的太对了,也许是每个人"本性"不同所致的,或者说是一种"度",正是这种差别,看来投资跟人的某一些性格是有关系的,这是篇好文章,感谢发表人和翻译人,谢谢!
• bnfan (2010-04-02 08:40): 这篇不久前看过，印象最深的是那个 Graham-and-Doddsville村比喻。这个链接不错，还有表，今天再读一遍。